LEVERAGING COMMERCIAL LOGISTICS CAPABILITIES IN THE JOINT ARENA
The twenty-first century thus far has been a very dynamic period of evolving change for the United States military. The Department of Defense (DOD) embarked on a strategy of transformation to redefine business operations and processes to improve support to the warfighter while enabling financial capability across the entire military. 1 This drive for efficiency of operations is viewed by some as incompatible with the ongoing and extensive combat operations in which U.S. military forces have been engaged during the same period. In the six years since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 , all of the Services have been engaged in both Afghanistan and Iraq fighting with the same doctrine, weapons, force structures, and resources that are simultaneously undergoing transformation. While this seemingly conflicting focus is not unprecedented for the U.S. military, it places significant strategic challenges on its leadership to achieve mission success and be innovative at the same time. More importantly though, this sort of internal conflict of priorities presents enormous opportunities for military leaders to pursue new ways to train, equip, and fight that otherwise might not have been considered. Logistics strategy and policy present such an opportunity for DOD leadership. While the days of large stockpiles of spare equipment, parts, and provisions wholly owned and controlled by the individual Services has become somewhat of a relic of the past, many opportunities still exist for the Services to redefine how logistics is delivered to the warfighter...opportunities that can improve support to the warfighter, save valuable resources, and open other strategic opportunities. This paper looks at one such opportunity --leveraging existing commercial logistics capabilities for Class IX material support. Specifically, this paper analyzes the strategic implications of leveraging the commercial capabilities already in place across the globe to facilitate logistics/sustainment support for regional joint operations. To do this, a review is provided of current logistics joint doctrine and the use of commercial industry to satisfy warfighting sustainment requirements. Additionally, it analyzes existing vehicles used by the military services and/or the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) along with other initiatives underway to expand the practice. In assessing the strategic implications, the paper examines the impact to both the U.S. domestic and international policy along with the unique opportunities for the Combatant Commanders (CCDR) to use commercial logistics contracts with non-U.S. commercial vendors as a tool to support the regional theater security cooperation (TSC) strategy.
Logistics Doctrine and Policy
To understand and assess the strategic implications for DOD in pursuing and expanding commercial logistics, it is important to first identify the existing policy and guidance. In his introductory letter to the Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations (JP 4-0), the then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, GEN Henry Shelton provided a very clear signal of intent with regard to the need for finding and exploiting innovative and transformational logistics processes. He identified a mandate for the Services to adjust the size of their inventories and take advantage of improved business practices and information technology because of limited resources. By cutting the costs of maintaining and distributing stockpiles of material, the Services can improve overall logistics support system responsiveness and force readiness. Moreover, the Chairman said that improved responsiveness, visibility, and access to logistic resources come from adopting technologies and processes of a distribution-based logistics system over a supply-based system. In giving this vision of mission support through less inventory, he saw the logistics sustainment pipeline from the source of supply to the warfighter as "the lifeblood of our combat power." 2 Beyond the stated guidance of the CJCS to pursue logistics innovation in order to improve warfighter support and achieve cost reductions, JP 4-0 also addresses the means to achieve this. While the Services are responsible for the logistics support of their own forces, Combatant Commanders (CCDRs) are tasked with the directive authority for logistics planning and operations within their theater of operations. The intent is to ensure effectiveness of operational plans while simultaneously preventing or eliminating duplication of logistics functions amongst the Services. To aide in that and to determine the actual theater requirements for operational planning, the CCDRs are directed to consider four elements of the logistics process: procurement and contracting, distribution, sustainment, and disposition and disposal.
3 Combatant
Commanders can and should provide input to the Services on how to address these elements so as to ensure that their forces are postured for effective and efficient sustainment. If, however, the commander's assessment of his area of operations (AOR) reveals inefficiencies or redundancies, he has the direct authority to shift or adjust the Services' logistics resources as necessary to support the mission. Tools like contracting for supplies and services, contingency contracting, and distribution process reengineering are available to the CCDR to achieve his operational ends. 4 Ultimately, the logistics support system in the AOR must be in alignment with the supported forces.
The resources must be optimized at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, which necessitate careful planning and buildup of inventory levels needed to sustain combat operations. 5 As part of the planning effort needed to ensure alignment, JP 4-0 specifically directs the identification of sources of supply and services from commercial activities and integration with the logistics operational requirements. 6 Logistics Theory and Supply Chain Management
To effectively take advantage of and exploit these individual logistics process opportunities directed in JP 4-0, the CCDRs and Services need to follow a coordinated approach. To a logistics professional, this is known as applying supply chain management (SCM). A concept not foreign to the Services, SCM is defined as the systematic, strategic coordination of traditional business functions and the tactics across these functions both within a particular organization and across businesses within the supply chain. The intent of SCM is the improvement of long-term performance of the individual organization and the supply chain in its entirety. 7 The Services and the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) each practice SCM as they perform inventory management functions for the repairable spare parts and consumable material under the cognizance. The management of the business processes and relationships with the organic and commercial organizations that produce, repair, stow, and distribute the inventories form the basis of existing SCM practices within the DOD.
All logisticians, whether in the military or private sector, must continually seek out ways to improve their SCM practices. As discussed above, SCM includes the strategic coordination of the traditional business functions together with the tactics or operating procedures used to specify elements of the supply chain. In conducting that strategic coordination, an organization may make adjustments or changes to its fundamental business operations in order to bring about improvements to the overall supply chain in which it operates. Because the supply chain includes that organization's partners and suppliers, this premise can also mean that a business process adjustment may be required by some of those partners and suppliers to effect improvement across the whole supply chain. To do this effectively necessitates collaboration among all players in the chain. Transportation, warehousing, and distribution functions are some of the business segments commercial industry often outsource. 10 In addition to following the commercial sector best practices, DOD logisticians must also recognize that the commercial industry is an integral partner in the execution of military supply chain management. In that partnership, they have a common concern with focused logistics, precision and velocity, coordinated delivery schedules, fast and flexible distribution, and good infrastructure and equipment distribution centers. This integration of the military and the private sector in the supply chain opens doors to achieve the direction laid out in JP 4-0. By way of example, the exchange of logistics information in the supply chain offers a source of efficiency for DOD and its commercial partners. Many private sector companies have turned to virtual service providers for the exchange of information among their global retail locations. Since economy of scale is the driving force in commercial industry, the larger the conglomerate of supply chain partners, the better for business. As the supply chain grows larger, information
technology, e-commerce, e-procurement, e-retailing, and the like become increasingly important. Suppliers of material for DOD can view each military installation or customer as a decentralized retail center. They can then be connected to the supplier's centralized major distribution center that can distribute supplies, thus making the military customer another hub in its logistics delivery chain. By turning over, or outsourcing, segments of inventory management like material distribution to the private sector, DOD follows a logistics process improvement strategy that gives the responsibility of material management to a commercial entity and relieves DOD of maintaining inventory in stock.
Material shortages, in general, are not the major obstacle in military logistics, but rather material availability at the requisitioner's location. 11 While not all military inventories can be turned over to the private sector for management, this option provides significant strategic opportunities for the DOD logisticians.
Strategic Implications of Commercial Logistics
Capitalizing on those strategic opportunities in a joint environment begins with the shipped by TRANSCOM via both air and sea lift during that period. 21 While this included all classes of material, it represents potentially significant opportunities for either transportation budget savings or in additional airlift capacity by leveraging third party, commercial logistics distribution opportunities.
The Services and DLA to date have established some successful third party, commercial logistics tools to deliver material and services to the warfighter. As the lead DOD agency for the procurement and management of general use materials and supplies, DLA has taken significant steps in the area of prime vendor contracts. In 1997, DLA altered its business practices and entered into long term prime vendor sustainment contracts with various suppliers to provide materials needed to support the maintenance, repair, and operation (MRO) of government facilities. The vendors that bid on the contracts did not need to make the items. Instead, the goal was to use purchasing power and commercial purchasing practices as a means to gain the best prices, rapid material delivery, and little to no overhead costs. The Defense Supply
Center Philadelphia (DSCP) was the lead contracting activity for DLA for this effort and set up multiple contracts with an average value of $500 million over two years. These The material is shipped from GSA warehouses to Japan for further transfer to Singapore before being loaded onto the Navy ships for further distribution/consumption.
This extended requisition, shipping, and delivery pipeline has resulted in a high incidence of backorders, increased costs due to complicated shipping routes, and long customer wait times. 23 During 2006, U.S. Navy ships deployed in the PACOM AOR experienced backorders on 31% of the GSA items that were ordered, which had a direct effect on the logistics response time (LRT) for the material. given there was no existing commercial contract in place within the region to gain access to the required items. As a result, NAVSUP determined there was strategic value in establishing a material prime vendor contract with a commercial source in Singapore --the Navy's logistics hub in Southeast Asia --which would benefit the government by reducing the Navy's investment in inventory, improving average customer wait times, creating transportation efficiencies, and reducing the receipt, storage, and reissue costs. 25 The specifics of this material prime vendor initiative are designed to address these existing logistics shortfalls while providing the strategic tool for the combatant commander. This prototype is intended to reduce retail inventory investment and improve system delivery performance for Class IX high-use consumable items. The initiative is focused on a pool of 450 items that represents 71% of the items that were requisitioned onboard U.S Navy ships operating in the Seventh Fleet. Likewise, this pool of items accounts for 52% of the requisitions that could not be filled from shipboard inventory. 26 Items in the prototype include high usage consumables such as rags, toilet paper, plastic/paper bags, mops, copy paper, and ball-point pens. 27 To execute the contract, the Navy selected the Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (FISC) Yokosuka, the Navy's supply center responsible for the Western Pacific AOR. Together with NAVSUP personnel, they developed a statement of work (SOW) that calls out specific performance criteria for potential bidders. The performance criteria include a material availability equal to or greater than the 92% effectiveness goal in the current GSA memorandum of agreement (MOA) with DOD, three day delivery, proper product labeling (e.g. national stock numbers and bar codes), ability to return undeliverable material, options to modify the range of items on contract, material costs equal to or less than current GSA pricing, and the use of Military Standard Requisitioning and Issue
Procedures (MILSTRIP) for Navy customers. Vendors who desire to bid on the contract will assume the inventory management responsibility from the Navy for these items and provide a transparent service to the customer using existing ordering and delivery
processes. This in turn will result in reduced Navy inventory investment, an equivalent or improved average customer wait time (ACWT) for these items, realized transportation efficiencies, and reduced storage/issue costs across the supply chain. 28 In addition to the benefits to the Navy, this material prime vendor initiative will also provide a strategic opportunity for the combatant commander. Specifically, the process efficiencies and inventory savings will directly support USPACOM's TSC efforts in Southeast Asia and provide a template for future commercial logistics initiatives to support other CCDRs. In Industries for the Blind. 32 While not an insurmountable obstacle for a potential contract bidder in Singapore, this U.S. domestic policy intended to provide employment opportunities for blind or disabled Americans may trump the strategic intent of the MPV.
If these items remain on the SOW, vendors in Singapore would have to demonstrate that they are procuring them from Ability One. This would result in an overall higher procurement cost for the items because of the associated costs to import them from the U.S. Attempts by the Navy to secure waivers from the Ability One requirement have been unsuccessful; as a result, the SOW was modified to remove those items, thus resulting in less than a full realization of potential inventory savings and transportation efficiencies. As of the writing of this paper, the SOW has yet to be advertised for bidders. Therefore, it remains to be seen if the removal of the Ability One items will have an impact on the pool of potential bidders for the contract. category. Additionally, they were pursuing a waiver request from the regulation. 34 If the Navy is unsuccessful in obtaining the waiver, the strategic benefits of the Singapore MPV prototype will be significantly decreased.
A third challenge encountered in establishing the Singapore MPV prototype is related to the process for placing orders against the contract vehicle once established.
While the primary goals in setting up a commercial prime vendor contract with international vendors are to leverage the local economy, reduce U.S. investment in inventory, and reduce transportation inefficiencies, the Navy leadership also wanted to ensure that customers would be able to use existing ordering procedures and processes. In other words, the intent was to have the sailor onboard a Navy ship operating in the PACOM AOR use the same process and logistics information technology (IT) systems to requisition, track status, receive, and financially manage requisitions as he does today. To do this, the contractor would need to be able to receive a MILSTRIP requisition that was generated from the existing shipboard supply and financial inventory management system. Most Navy ships today use a version of RSupply that manages retail level inventories, generates requisitions and receives status via standard MILSTRIP, and maintains memorandum operating budget financial records. However, most of the existing prime vendor contractors use web-based ordering to receive and process requisitions from customers. Currently the Navy's shipboard IT systems for supply and financial management can not interface directly with web-based ordering tools. Because of this, customers must create a memorandum requisition in the IT system while the actual order is placed on the contractor's web site.
This separate process for ordering, tracking, receiving, and financial transaction accounting for the prime vendor items creates inefficiencies for the warfighting customer and is susceptible to errors. To overcome this, the Navy is evaluating a number of different alternatives that use existing IT systems and processes. Unfortunately, each one fails to seamlessly integrate the current shipboard ordering and receiving system with vendor processes. As a result, local "work arounds" would have to be established for the dual processes. 35 If the Navy does not expend resources to modify the IT systems, tradeoffs will have to be made on the amount of risk willing to be accepted with the receiving and ordering processes afloat in order to achieve the greater goals of establishing the MPV.
Conclusion and Recommendations
The idea of using commercial logistics to gain a strategic advantage has been a part of U.S. military history as far back as the Revolutionary War. On Christmas night, 1776, the U.S. Army successfully crossed the ice-filled Delaware River and destroyed a
British Army outpost at Trenton, NJ. This battlefield victory was due in large part to the tactical decision of General George Washington to move his troops by employing large, shallow-draft wide-beamed commercial watercraft that were designed to carry heavy and outsized cargo on shallow waters. 36 As this paper has articulated, commercial Navy's material prime vendor initiative discussed in this paper has the advantage of providing these same benefits for logistics sustainment while offering the additional strategic tool to the CCDR of supporting his Theater Security Strategy. By contracting with a Singaporean vendor to provide the high use consumable material to Navy customers operating in the Southeast Asian region, the benefits to the local economy further enhance strategic cooperation between the U.S. and the host country while supporting long-term U.S. strategic interests.
As highlighted in this paper, this material prime vendor initiative faces major hurdles for it to realize its full strategic potential. Primary among them are the Balance of Payments program and the Ability One/JWOD program. While a Singaporean vendor could bid on the contract and demonstrate it would source the Class IX consumables referenced in the SOW through Ability One and that they would be manufactured in the U.S., the potential for it to execute the contract at an overall savings to DOD is low given the vendor would have to pass on the importation costs along in its item pricing.
The strategic benefits for the Services, the combatant commander, and the U.S. from programs like this are significant enough that existing domestic policy should be changed. For this to happen, the individual service chiefs first must align their logistics requirements with those of the CCDR since they have the Title X responsibility for budgeting logistics resources. Secondly, the combination of the commercial logistics and theater security cooperation opportunities are incentive for DOD to work with Congress to amend current policies and laws. This would not be easy given the potential of this being perceived as detrimental to domestic interests from lost revenue to U.S. businesses and disabled persons. It, however, is the opinion of this author that the strategic benefits to the U.S. from these sorts of programs outweigh any negative
